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Abstract
Ad-hoc networks are on the forefront of technological advances as more
embedded devices allow for wireless communications without necessarily
requiring a network infrastructure to connect to. One of the larger prob-
lems associated with such ad-hoc networks is the lack of being able to
access a PKI to create individual secure sessions for these groups being
created. For this project, an implementation generating the public and
private keys for an RSA public-key protocol has been created on top of the
M2MI middleware developed at RIT. In this implementation, as originally
described by Dan Boneh, all parties help contribute to the generation of
the RSA public modulus, N , without explicitly knowing the factorization
of it. It has been shown that this implementation requires, on average,
32689 rounds of the protocol to create a 1024-bit RSA modulus for the
group, and has an approximate growth of log2(N)
25
rounds per bit.
1 Introduction
Recent publications have outlined a method for creating an RSA modulus, com-
prised of two prime numbers, within a distributed group to be possible. This
project uses the M2MI layer developed at the Rochester Institute of Technology
to create a group RSA modulus with separate decryption keys for each player
in the group.
A few assumptions were made for the sake of simplicity. One such assump-
tion is that each of the players will follow an honest-but-curious scenario and
will not stray from the protocol. Secondly, a secure layer between the commu-
nicating objects was not added. Instead, it was assumed that all group public
communications would be handled over an M2MI.Omnihandle whereas all private
communications were over M2MI.Unihandles. This decision was made to limit
the scope of the project to the creation of the RSA group. This is not an issue
since the M2MI layer can be modified for secure Unihandle communications
without affecting the results from this project.
2 Classical RSA
The classical RSA algorithm was developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Len Adleman at MIT in 1977. It is a public-key cryptography system that
works between two parties over a public channel with the intention on making
the channel private without requiring any previous communications.
2.1 RSA Algorithm Overview
The original algorithm as presented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman uses the
properties of modular exponentiation along with prime numbers to “secretly”
share information over a public channel. The algorithm uses the product of
4
RSA Algorithm
Input: Nothing
Output: Public-key(e,N), Private-key(p, q, d)
1. Choose two large prime numbers: p, q
2. Compute N = p · q
3. Compute φ(N) = (p− 1) · (q − 1)
4. Choose an integer e such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1
5. Compute d such that de = 1 mod(φ(N))
Figure 1: Original RSA Algorithm
two very large prime numbers to create a public modulus to perform numeric
operations on which allows for information to be obscured in a way believed to
be very difficult to reverse without knowing the factorization of the modulus.
Though it is not proven that factorization is a problem that is extremely
difficult, it is believed to be within that problem class. For that reason, RSA is
the standard used in electronic commerce websites throughout the Internet.
2.2 RSA Example
A simple example is shown so that the steps of the RSA protocol can be followed
and correlated to the group setting as presented later in the paper. It should
be noted that even using relatively small values for p and q yields a relatively
large value for N .
Using the values e = 31, p = 887 and q = 991, calculate d and test encryption
and decryption.
N = 887 · 991
N = 879017
φ(N) = 886 · 990
φ(N) = 877140
e = 31
d = e−1 mod φ(N)
d = 707371
After calculating d, we can test the algorithm by encrypting a test message.
For this, we will use m = 192.
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c = me mod N
c = 19231 mod 879017
c = 118121
For this particular example, the ciphertext being sent over the public chan-
nel is equal to the number 118121 mod 879017. At this point, we should be able
to apply the decryption exponent as calculated to reveal the original message.
p = cd mod N
p = 118121707371 mod 879017
p = 192
Thus, the RSA public-key crypto system example shows that given the cor-
rect public and private-key pairs, a message can be sent over public channels
safely and securely.
The values for p and q used in the example are very small numbers - on
the order of 10-bits. For standard security, a 1024-bit modulus (512-bit prime
numbers) should be considered. If higher security is desired, a 2048-bit mod-
ulus should be used with other precautions when choosing the values of p and
q. Further information can be referenced in Bruce Schneier’s book, Applied
Cryptography.
3 k-Group RSA
The idea behind RSA is very important to understand as it allows two parties
to share information over a public channel in such a manner that only those
members will know exactly what is being communicated. In a group setting,
doing such a thing would require pairs between everyone being formed and the
same message being encrypted k times, sent k times, and decrypted k times.
The goal for a group setting should be one message being encrypted, broadcast
once to everyone, decrypted and shared k times.
3.1 RSA Group Transition
The RSA algorithm has been incorporated into many electronic commerce pro-
tocols and is widely regarded as the de-facto standard for public-key cryptogra-
phy. Unfortunately, the original RSA algorithm only works when dealing with
a two-party system and wanting to securely share information between the two
parties over a public channel.
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k-Group RSA Algorithm
Input: Nothing
Output: Public-key(e,N), k Private-keys(pi, qi, ri, α, β)
1. Members choose random values for p and q
2. Members share and combine p and q candidates to calculate N
3. Members collectively test biprimality of N based on Fermat test
4. Members collectively test biprimality of N based on Boneh protocol
5. Use Catalano protocol to calculate individual private keys
Figure 2: k-Group RSA Algorithm
Luckily, due to the homomorphic properties of the original RSA concept,
the algorithm needs only a few collaborative tweaks to extend from a two-
party system to an k-party algorithm. Dan Boneh described an algorithm in
which the homomorphic properties of the algorithm are exploited while using
the scrambling and secure properties of distributed polynomial computation to
create a group RSA protocol.
3.2 k-Group RSA Algorithm Overview
The algorithm leverages Shamir’s “How To Share A Secret” paper wherein he
proposes using randomly generated polynomials to perform such tasks as ad-
dition and multiplication. The method, as proposed by Shamir, uses the free
term, or f(0), of the polynomial as the value to be shared with every other
coefficient randomly chosen. Overall, this is a very effective way of sharing the
information with the group of semi-trusted players.
Once members are chosen, the algorithm is followed with points restarting
with failures for the tests. For example, the biprimality tests may fail numerous
times before the Catalano protocol is actually started.
All the data that was shared on an individual basis with each of the players
was done so that a small modification to the M2MI layer can handle the level
of point-to-point secure channels required.
4 Creating the Group
There are two different roles when forming a group: initiator and member. The
initiator is, as the name suggests, the member which suggests forming the group.
There can only be one initiator of a group, but many members. Moreover, the
initiator has the special task of maintaining the state of the different members
of the group and ensuring synchronization in the protocol. Members, on the
other hand, are simply players in the creation process. Their main purpose is
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to perform tasks and report back to the initiator.
Since the entire group creation process starts with the initiator, it’s up to
the initiator to create the member threshold and keep track of members joining
and requesting to join the group. As members are being added to the group, a
member list is constructed with an associated member ID. The initiator always
has a member ID of 1 while every other member can have any other number,
but for simplicity an incrementing member ID is used.
After the initiator has the required number of members in the member list,
the list is distributed to all members. From this point, the algorithm starts the
distributed process of calculating all necessary information for the formation of
the secure group.
5 Choosing and Sharing Candidates
Once the group is created, it is up to the initiator to keep track of the state of
each of the members. Moreover, it is up to the member to keep sending updated
states to the initiator after completing a task.
5.1 Choosing Candidates
After the initial formation of the group and the member list is shared, the first
step of the process is to select candidates and the sharing polynomials for the
secret values of p and q.
For biprimality testing purposes later in the protocol, the secret values for
p and q have to be Blum integers, or integers that are congruent to 3 mod 4.
To ensure this, the initiator chooses their candidate to be congruent to 3 mod 4
while each member chooses a candidate that is congruent to 0 mod 4.
For choosing the polynomials for candidate sharing, each group member (in-
cluding the initiator) chooses two random bk2 c degree polynomials, f(x) and
g(x) where k is equal to the number of members in the entire group and the free
term is equal to the candidate value. This will allow that for every f(x) chosen
by every member, the evaluation f(0) is equal to their candidate, pi. The same
logic can be applied to g(0) and the respective candidate qi.
Lastly, a randomizing polynomial, h(x) with a degree of k − 1 and a free
term of 0 is chosen. This is strictly used as an extra measure for randomization.
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5.2 Sharing Through Polynomials
As Shamir pointed out in his essay “How To Share A Secret”, the use of poly-
nomials can be used to create a system where an unknown secret can be shared
between multiple parties. The interesting note in regard to this polynomial
sharing is that each member has the ability to contribute to the secret without
explicitly knowing the value of the secret in question. It is through this property
that the candidates for p and q are shared and combined.
Player f(x) g(x) h(x)
1 143x+299 −240x+311 178x2−582x+0
2 −180x+424 50x+400 24x2−210x+0
3 100x+164 −64x+280 93x2+ 40x+0
Table 1: Players’ choices of f(x), g(x), and h(x)
For an example, a small k = 3 group is being used, though the size of the
group can be arbitrarily large. Each of the players chooses f(x), g(x), and h(x)
polynomials and sets their respective free terms to pi, qi and 0. In the example,
p1 corresponds to the value of 299, q1 to 311, p2 to 424, q2 to 400, p3 to 164,
and finally q3 to 280.
Note here that, in the example, the sum of the f(x) free terms is 887 and
the sum of the g(x) free terms is 991 - two distinct prime numbers. Moreover,
note the product of the two values is 879017. Lastly, note that the values for
p1 and q1 correlates to the proper Blum values that should be chosen for the
initiator of the group.
With the polynomials chosen, each player can now securely and individually
share the evaluation of each of the functions with each other player. Each of the
k players evaluates the values of f(x), g(x), and h(x) for every other members
member ID and shares those values.
Playeri fj(i) values gj(i) values hj(i) values
1 442+244+264 71+450+216 -404-186+133
2 585+ 64+364 -169+500+152 -452-324+452
3 728 - 116+464 -409+550+ 88 -144-414+957
Table 2: Calculating individual components for each player
For example, Player1 will receive k different shared values for each of the
functions: fj(1), gj(1), and hj(1). Player2 has their functions evaluated at the
value of 2, and so forth up until Playerk is evaluated at k.
At this point, each player has shared their partial information with each
other without revealing anything other than a single point on a secret polyno-
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mial. To get useful information from this, those secret polynomials are combined
to create a single polynomial with the free term equal to the product of the sum
of the free terms of all fj(x) and gj(x).
6 Finding the product N from Shared Candi-
dates
Now, each player uses the data they have collected to create their individual N -
share polynomial point. Each of these shares will then be viewed as a function
evaluation of N(i), where i is the member ID associated with the player.
N(i) =
k∑
j=0
fj(i) ·
k∑
j=0
gj(i) +
k∑
j=0
hj(i)
Note the manipulation reveals nothing about the free-term of the polynomial
generated in N(x). In fact, all this function does is find a single point, i, on the
function N(x) which is a k − 1 degree polynomial.
Playeri fj(i) sum gj(i) sum hj(i) sum N(i)
1 950 737 -457 699693
2 1013 483 -324 488955
3 1076 229 399 246803
Table 3: Calculation of individual N(i) components
6.1 Adding and Multiplying Candidates
In this step, an individual and secure communication is sent between each of
the members of the group. The data being shared uses each member’s ID to
evaluate the functions f(x), g(x), and h(x). Each member sends this triple to
each other member using their respective member ID for evaluation.
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∑
f(i) =
k∑
x=1
fx(i)
∑
g(i) =
k∑
x=1
gx(i)
∑
h(i) =
k∑
x=1
hx(i)
N(i) =
∑
f(i) ·
∑
g(i) +
∑
h(i)
After each member, i, receives k triples, each member then calculates the
value of N(i) which are points on a k− 1 degree polynomial with the free term
equal to the product of the sum of the shares pi and qi.
6.2 Lagrange Interpolation
At this point, all the members have secretly shared their private picks, pi and qi,
mixed together with their randomizing function. On top of that, each member
then multiplied out their share of the sharing. The result is a set of at least k
points on a polynomial of degree k − 1. Since there are k known points on the
polynomial, a technique of Lagrange interpolation can be used to calculate the
free term.
P (x) =
n∑
j=1
Pj(x)
Pj(x) = yj
n∏
k=1
k 6=j
x− xk
xj − xk
The Lagrange interpolation takes the k points on the k − 1 polynomial as
(xk, yk) pairs and can interpolate the exact value of any arbitrary value, P (x).
In the case of all of the sharing done, the member ID always correlates to
the xk value with the yk value being calculated at the steps. Calculating the
interpolated P (x) value ends up being a relatively trivial calculation.
6.2.1 Lagrange Example
Given the k points from the previous exchange of values, points on the k − 1
degree polynomial are used to calculate the free-term of the polynomial, P (0).
The Lagrange interpolated value is the sum of the products for a value of x = 0.
After finding the values for Pj(0), the free term is calculated by using the
corresponding yj values, multiplying them and using their sum. The free term
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Playerj yj Pj(x) yj · Pj(x)
1 699693 0−21−2 · 0−31−3 2099079
2 488955 0−12−1 · 0−32−3 -1466865
3 246803 0−13−1 · 0−23−2 246803
Table 4: Lagrange interpolation of players values
calculated is equivalent to the value of N in the group creation scheme. In this
case, the value of N is calculated to be 879017.
After calculating N , the validity that N is truly a composite of two and only
two primes must be tested. Therefore, probabilistic biprimality tests are used
to try to determine, with a high amount of certainty, that the modulus created
by the group truly is a composite of nothing more than two prime numbers.
7 Testing Biprimality of N
Simply creating the product of the sum of some candidates does not necessarily
make a good RSA modulus. Remembering the requirements for an RSA modu-
lus, the product should strictly be a product of two prime numbers. Other than
factoring the number, there are no ways of testing strict biprimality with full
confidence, but there are a few different probabilistic tests that can be done.
These tests provide a high enough probability to be reliable, though it should be
noted that a test message should be encrypted and decrypted to be completely
positive.
7.1 Trial Division
The simplest of all the testing, trial division only requires the initiator to per-
form some division upon finding the public modulus, N . The idea stems from
the fact that most composite numbers are composed of many small factors, and
not necessarily a few large ones. Compiling a table of the first several thousand
prime numbers requires very little effort and only a small amount of memory.
Moreover, the test requires absolutely no communication.
Implementing this test can occur in two different ways. The first utilizes the
initiator as the performer of the test. A problem with this model is the fact
that one player is performing all the computations while all other players are
sitting idle. This isn’t a very efficient use of the computational power presented
by the group, but it is very efficient with regards to communications.
The second implementation utilizes a somewhat distributed method of di-
vision. Given that every player has a list of the prime numbers, once the
value of N has been computed, each player can then automatically start with
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the trial division testing. Instead of testing every number, given a group
of size k, each member will test every kth + ID number. For example, the
initiator of the group divides by elements in the prime number array with
indices of 1, k + 1, 2k + 1, 3k + 1, ... while a player with an ID of 2 checks
2, k + 2, 2k + 2, 3k + 2, ... etc. Therefore, the trial division task is split up
into k tasks, all with similar computational complexity. If any of the players
report failure, the initiator can then restart the protocol from the beginning
with very minimal communication.
The particular implementation used should depend completely on the ap-
plication along with the requirements of the protocol. One uses more time due
to computing complexity but uses no communications, while the other uses less
processor power but requires more communications.
7.2 Fermat Test
The first test performed is a modified Fermat primality test. In the normal
Fermat primality test, a generator of the group, g, is calculated and raised to
the value p− 1 all taken mod p. If the number is prime, then the value should
be congruent to 1, otherwise the number is considered composite.
φ(p) = p− 1
φ(p · q) = (p− 1) · (q − 1)
φ(N) = p · q − p− q + 1
This test can be extended such that any generator, g, raised to the value
φ(N), where N is the number being checked, is congruent to 1 mod N . In the
case of biprimality where N is a composite of p and q primes, φ(N) is equal to
the value of N − p− q + 1.
gφ(p) ≡ 1 mod p
gφ(N) ≡ 1 mod N
gN−p−q+1 ≡ 1 mod N
For security purposes, the values of p and q must be kept secret, as well as
φ(p), φ(q) and φ(N). To keep all these numbers secret in the case of a distributed
p and q, the initiator chooses a random group generator, g, and calculates the
value gN−pi−qi+1 while all other members calculate values g−(pi+qi) all taken
mod N . All the values are shared in a protocol which is similar to the previous
polynomial sharing method, but changes the free term of the polynomial to allow
for multiplicative sharing instead of the additive sharing as used previously.
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7.2.1 Fermat Example
To safely perform the Fermat test over the group of shared candidates, a poly-
nomial sharing scheme is used similar to the candidate sharing and combining,
except the function performed on the received points of the polynomial is only
multiplication.
To perform the test, the initiator finds a generator number, g, and evalu-
ates the Jacobi symbol
(
g
N
)
= −1. This is done to show the generator is
a quadratic nonresidue of the modulus N . Once chosen, this generator of the
group is distributed among the players and is used for the Fermat test.
Next, the initiator calculates the value gN−p1−q1+1 mod N while all other
players calculate g−(pi+qi) mod N . Continuing, each player then chooses a
random polynomial for each of the other players, setting the product of the free
terms of each polynomial to be the value calculated for the Fermat test.
k∏
n=1
fn(0) =
{
gN−pi−qi i = 1
g−(pi+qi) i 6= 1
k∏
i=1
k∏
j=1
fi,j(0) ≡ 1 mod N
For the current example, the Jacobi symbol for
(
27
879017
)
= −1. Using this as
the generator, g, each player then calculates the Fermat test value to be shared.
Player Fermat Test Fermat Value
1 gN−p1−q1+1 193382
2 g−(p2+q2) 565943
3 g−(p3+q3) 716811
Table 5: Calculating Fermat Values for players
This section extends the example throughout the paper by showing the Fer-
mat Testing phase. The Benaloh protocol can be referenced from the Boneh
paper and will not be shown in detail for simplicity and clearness of the exam-
ple.
7.3 Step(4) Test
The second test that is performed tests a specific property of composite numbers
which fall into the category of having gcd(N, p + q − 1) > 1. Testing this
condition is done by calculating a multiple of p + q − 1 and testing the GCD
against the already known value of N .
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z =
(
k∑
i=1
ri
)
·
(
−1 +
k∑
i=1
(pi + qi)
)
mod N
To create this calculation, every party chooses a random value, ri, and also
calculates the sum pi + qi. Using the method that was described for sharing
and combining the candidates chosen to create N , these same values are shared.
Once the values are shared, the initiator can check to see if the test passes.
7.3.1 Step(4) Example
After testing to see if the initial Fermat test passes, the last condition is to
check if gcd(N, p+ q − 1) > 1. To do this, a simplified algorithm is explained
by Boneh in which the condition is secretly calculated and shared amongst the
players then checked by the initiator.
Player ri pi + qi
1 839859 299 + 311
2 371743 424 + 400
3 120430 164 + 280
Table 6: Players choice of ri, and pi + qi
Evaluating the function, it is found that gcd(879017, 299716) is calculated
and is 1 which confirms the suspicion that N is a composite of two primes (at
least probabilistically).
8 Finding e−1 mod φ(N)
After it is fairly certain that N is a composite of two primes, the last step
is to calculate the multiplicative inverse of the encryption exponent. As an
industry standard, the number 65537 is often used as a standard encryption
exponent since it only has 2 set bits in the binary representation, thus simpli-
fying the square-and-multiply method of modular exponentiation, although the
algorithm used can find the inverse using any encryption exponent.
The Catalano method of computing inverses over a shared secret modulus
creates some large numbers and trades complexity for network transmissions.
In this case, the ease of the algorithm coupled with the decrease in network
traffic was a formidable tradeoff.
In this method, we have the k-players all participating in the calculation.
Each player starts with their input of the share of the secret modulus, φi (as
described and used in the Fermat test), multiplied by a factor of L = k!. This
is accomplished through a bk2 c-degree polynomial, f(z), with the free term equal
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to Lφ.
In the first round of the protocol, the players jointly generate two random
bk2 c-degree polynomials, g(z) and h(z) with free terms Lλ and LR, respectively,
along with a random k-degree polynomial, ρ(z), with a free term of 0.
In the second round, they reconstruct the k-degree polynomial F (z) =
f(z) ·g(z)+e ·h(z)+ρ(z) and recover the free term γ = F (0) = L2λφ+LRe.
Finally, the extended Euclidean algorithm is used to compute a and b such
that aγ + be = 1. Each player, Pi, computes their share of d by setting
di = a · h(i) + b.
γ = L2λφ+ LRe
aγ + be = 1
d = (aLR+ b) mod φ
This works because of the following observation.
aγ + be = 1
a(L2γφ+ LRe) + be = 1
aLRe+ be = 1 mod φ
e(aLR+ b) = 1 mod φ
d = (aLR+ b) mod φ
At the end of the protocol, every player then has the same values for a
and b leaving their individual h(i) values unique. Decryption of the ciphertext
then becomes as simple as each player raising the original ciphertext to their
respective h(i) values and sharing them directly with each of their partners.
Since the values of a and b are known throughout the group, each player can
then combine the messages appropriately and yield the plaintext.
cLR =
k∏
i=1
ch(i)
p = caLR · cb mod N
p = c(aLR+b) mod N
8.1 Calculating di Example
In keeping with the example throughout the paper, consider the encryption
exponent e = 31. First, each player must choose their values for λi and ri
where R =
∑
ri.
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Playeri φi λi ri
1 878408 5823927 3829593
2 -824 983817 49298481
3 -444 57372759 2727639
Table 7: Players value of φi and choice of λi and ri
Once combined through the BGW protocol using polynomials and solved,
we can then calculate the value of F (0) = λ = L2λφ+ LRe.
λ =
k∑
i=1
λi
λ = 64180503
R =
k∑
i=1
ri
R = 55855713
γ = λφ+Re
γ = (64180503 · 877140) + (55855713 · 31)
γ = 56297017928523
At this point, the value of γ, which everyone has, is calculated. Finally, the
values of a and b can be computed using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to
finish the secret key information.
aγ + be = 1
a · 56297017928523 + b · 31 = 1
a = −1
b = 1816032836404
At this point, the group creation is complete and a secure RSA group has
been created. The only thing left to do, at this point, is to test a message.
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9 Testing The Group
In testing the group, any member can take a message and encrypt it using the
known encryption value of e. Once the plaintext message, p, is encrypted to
ciphertext c, it can then be broadcast to every player. To decrypt, each player
raises c to their secret ri value chosen when finding the inverse of the modulus.
Each player shares this information secretly between each other player. Once
every secret has been applied to the c message, decryption is completed by
applying the values of a and b also found in the last stage of the protocol.
For the example, using encryption exponent e = 31 and plaintext p = 192,
the message is encrypted to be a value of 118121 mod 879017. Each player
applies their own ri value to ciphertext c as shown in the table.
Player ri cri mod N
1 3829593 630442
2 49298481 354970
3 2727639 586512
Table 8: Determining plaintext p from ciphertext c
cR =
k∏
i=1
cri mod N
cR = 173591
The values of a and b are then applied in a way which satisfies the decryption
exponent definition as stated before. It should be noted where numbers may
be taken mod N and where they cannot since the real number definition is in
terms of mod φ(N). The value of cR may be taken in terms of mod N , but the
values of a and b cannot since the values are raised to that power.
p = caR · cb mod N
p = 173591−1 · 1181211816032836404 mod 879017
p = 276292 · 805843 mod 879017
p = 192
The group is tested and it is shown that the RSA group is secure without
ever revealing the values of prime numbers p or q.
10 Software Architecture
The implementation of the k-Group RSA protocol leverages off of the M2MI
middleware layer developed at the Rochester Institute of Technology Computer
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Science Department. This layer allows for broadcast messages to efficiently be
implemented along with direct one-to-one communication within the same pro-
gramming interface.
Moreover, some extra classes were created for helping with the rather large
numbers used within the protocol. Specifically, a BigRational class is used to
express exact ratios as used within the protocol. One particular place where
this is required is the Lagrange polynomial interpolation used to find the free
term of random polynomials chosen for secret sharing.
10.1 Interface Programming
The Many-to-Many Invocation (M2MI) layer created at the Rochester Institute
of Technology abstracts any remote method calls to appear as simple method
calls on simple objects. Any and all marhsalling of data objects as well as com-
munication channel considerations are handled by the M2MI layer.
For this to be successful, M2MI requires that interfaces be predefined for
method execution. This is advantageous for a few different reasons, the first
being that any implementation can be used as long as it adheres to the interface
rules. For example, one implementation for a desktop computer might not
be suitable for a mobile or embedded device, yet they are still able to talk
to each other because the interface is well defined. Second, it allows for the
software architecture to explore the different use cases of the design without
requiring a strict implementation. Lastly, and especially for the case of this
project, it allows for the programmer to abstract the channel down a layer
and not have to necessarily worry about it. For example, this project requires
that all individual communication that occurs between objects has to be in
a secure channel. Since this is outside of the scope of the project, this was
not implemented, but extending this capability is easily done by creating a
SecureUnihandle object for the M2MI layer.
10.2 BigRational Class
Many of the operations that occur during the protocol require accurate repre-
sentations of very large numbers. Moreover, manipulations of those numbers
often require them to be represented as a ratio of two extremely large numbers.
Due to this fact, a class was specifically made to aide in the manipulation of
these ratios while maintaining exact accuracy.
10.3 Polynomial Class
When Shamir explained his secret sharing scheme, it involved the usage of
polynomials of varying degree being evaluated at multiple values while using
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class BigRational implements Serializable {
BigRational( )
BigRational( BigInteger num )
BigRational( BigInteger num, BigInteger denom )
BigRational( int num, int denom )
BigRational( BigRational x )
BigRational add( BigRational x )
BigRational multiply( BigRational x )
BigRational multiply( long x )
BigRational pow( int power )
BigRational divide( BigRational x )
BigRational[] divideEvenly( int n )
int compareTo( BigRational x )
BigRational[] divideRandomly( Random rnd, int n )
static BigRational next( Random rnd, int numBits )
BigRational abs( )
String toString( )
static BigRational valueOf( int x )
BigInteger intPart( )
BigRational negate( )
}
Figure 3: BigRational Class Public Methods
Lagrange interpolation to calculate the free term. Boneh leverages off these
random polynomials with known free terms as well. The Polynomial class is
used for both creation and evaluation of the required polynomials.
class Polynomial {
Polynomial( Random rnd, int degree )
Polynomial( Random rnd, int degree, BigRational c )
Polynomial( Random rnd, int degree, BigInteger c )
BigRational f( int x )
BigRational f( BigRational x )
BigRational f( BigInteger x )
String toString( )
}
Figure 4: Polynomial Class Public Methods
10.4 Lagrange Class
The use of polynomials within the protocol helps with sharing secrets securely
between different members of the group. To do this effectively, an interpolation
technique must be used to solve for a specific term of a k-degree polynomial
using at least k + 1 points, where k is the size of the group used within the
protocol. Lagrange interpolation is a method of calculating arbitrary points on
an unknown polynomial when only a mapping of x, y values are known.
10.5 BonehRSA Interface
The BonehRSA interface is the collection of methods which allow for the execution
of the protocol as explained by Boneh. The structure of the interface generally
has a method to start a particular part of the protocol which is broadcast to
every object participating within the group accompanied by a method which is
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final class Lagrange {
static BigRational rationalPointsInterpolation(
BigRational x,
Set<Map.Entry<BigRational,BigRational>> xys )
static BigRational integerPointsInterpolation(
BigRational x,
Set<Map.Entry<BigInteger,BigRational>> xys )
}
Figure 5: Lagrange Class Public Methods
used to specifically share data between pairs of objects.
interface BonehRSA {
void announceGroup( BonehRSA initiator, String groupName ) ;
void joinGroup( String groupName, BonehRSA client ) ;
void assignMemberID( String groupName, int ID ) ;
void rejectJoinGroup( String groupName ) ;
void distributeMemberList( String groupName, ConcurrentHashMap<BonehRSA, BigInteger> groupHandle) ;
void chooseCandidates( ) ;
void operationComplete( BonehRSA client, BonehRSAState state ) ;
void shareCandidates( ) ;
void shareCandidate( BonehRSA client, BigRational pEval, BigRational qEval, BigRational hEval ) ;
void ensureCandidatesShared( ) ;
void shareShare( BonehRSA client, BigRational nPart ) ;
void shareShares( ) ;
void ensureSharesShared( ) ;
void calculateN( ) ;
void calculateFermatValues( BigInteger g ) ;
void shareFermatValues( ) ;
void shareFermatValue( BonehRSA client, BigRational x ) ;
void ensureFermatValuesShared( ) ;
void shareFermatProducts( ) ;
void shareFermatProduct( BonehRSA client, BigRational x ) ;
void chooseZValues( ) ;
void shareZValues( ) ;
void shareZValue( BonehRSA client, BigRational rPart, BigRational pqPart ) ;
void ensureZValuesShared( ) ;
void reportZi( ) ;
void sendZi( BonehRSA client, BigRational zi ) ;
void reinitialize( BonehRSA client ) ;
void chooseCatalanValues( ) ;
void shareCatalanValues( ) ;
void shareCatalanValue( BonehRSA client, BigRational fzValue, BigRational gzValue, BigRational hzValue, BigRational rhozValue ) ;
void ensureCatalanValuesShared( ) ;
void calculateCatalanProducts( ) ;
void shareCatalanProducts( ) ;
void shareCatalanProduct( BonehRSA client, BigRational cValue ) ;
void ensureCatalanProductsShared( ) ;
void calculateD( ) ;
void decrypt( BigInteger ct ) ;
void shareMessage( BonehRSA client, BigInteger encryptedMsg, BigInteger decryptedMsg ) ;
}
Figure 6: BonehRSA Public Interface
10.6 BonehRSAState Enumeration
Every object that implements the BonehRSA interface also follows a basic state
enumeration which is defined by the BonehRSAState enumeration. The state
reported by each object is the current state within the protocol that the object is
ready to perform. Each state corresponds to a method which is defined within
the BonehRSA interface. The purpose of this enumeration is to keep track of
where in the protocol the particular object is and be able to report it back
to the initiator object. Lastly, upon each state update for each object, the
current state is reported back to the initiator. Once an object has reached the
D_CALCULATED state, the object has been initialized and is ready for encrypting
and decrypting messages passed to it.
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public enum BonehRSAState {
UNINITIALIZED,
MEMBERLIST_RECEIVED,
CANDIDATES_CHOSEN,
CANDIDATES_SHARED,
CANDIDATES_ENSURED,
SHARES_SHARED,
SHARES_ENSURED,
N_CALCULATED,
FERMAT_CALCULATED,
FERMAT_VALUES_SHARED,
FERMAT_VALUES_ENSURED,
FERMAT_PRODUCTS_SHARED,
Z_VALUES_CHOSEN,
Z_VALUES_SHARED,
Z_VALUES_ENSURED,
ZI_REPORTED,
CATALAN_VALUES_CHOSEN,
CATALAN_VALUES_SHARED,
CATALAN_VALUES_ENSURED,
CATALAN_PRODUCTS_CALCULATED,
CATALAN_PRODUCTS_SHARED,
CATALAN_PRODUCTS_ENSURED,
D_CALCULATED
} ;
Figure 7: BonehRSAState Enumeration
10.7 BonehObject
The BonehObject implements the BonehRSA interface and is the main object of
interest throughout the implmentation. Most of the methods which belong to
the BonehObject are that of the BonehRSA interface. To configure the object
as an initiator, the setName() method must be used to set the group name
as well as setSize() method to specify how many members the group needs.
Lastly, the runGroup() method is called to run the protocol. This sends out the
request for other members to join the group. The only configuration required
to be considered for group membership is the creation of a new BonehObject.
All BonehObjects automatically listen for all incoming group requests and try
to join if they are not already a member of a group.
10.8 Setting Up The Groups
When setting up a number of participants, only an instance of the BonehObject
is required to be created before a group can start to be formed. Objects inher-
ently want to join a group as long as there is a request being sent.
Since the Boneh protocol depends on one object being the initiator of the
group and all the other objects are simply orchestrated by the initiator, setting
up a group requires k − 1 listening nodes and 1 initiator. To setup a listening
node, a new instantiation of the BonehObject is required. A name for the node
is required to be given in the constructor, while a seed for all random number
generation is optional. Currently, this listening object will respond and join the
first group that it hears from.
BonehObject bo = new BonehObject( "Listener0", 12345678L ) ;
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Figure 8: Initiator Using M2MI for Group Communication
To create an initiator, a few extra steps are required. First, a group name is
required to keep track of different groups. This is setup using the setGroupName()
method. Next, the minimum number of bits for the modulus N is required. The
only guarantee given is that the modulus will be at least the number specified.
This is specified using the setNumBits() method. Next, the size of the group
needs to be specified. This also corresponds to the number of different shares
that are produced for the group and is set using the setNumberOfShares()
method.
BonehObject bo = new BonehObject( "Initiator" ) ;
bo.setGroupName( "SecureGroup" ) ;
bo.setNumBits( 1024 ) ;
bo.setNumberOfShares( 5 ) ;
bo.runGroup( ) ;
Figure 9: Example Setting Up The Initiator
Listeners don’t necessarily have to be on a different machine as the initiator
is, and in fact a small program can be created which runs on a single computer
to run trial tests.
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private static int performTest( int k, int numBits ) {
BonehObject[] bos = new ObjectObject[k] ;
for( int i = 0 ; i < k ; i++ )
bos[i] = new BonehObject( "" + i ) ;
bos[0].setGroupName( "TestGroup" ) ;
bos[0].setNumBits( numBits ) ;
bos[0].setNumberOfShares( k ) ;
bos[0].runGroup( ) ;
}
Figure 10: Test method for Group Creation
10.9 Running The Protocol
The main protocol operates in a command relationship between the initiator
of the group and the members of the group. The initiator sends out method
requests for the different portions of the algorithm all while the members of the
group report back their current state to the initiator.
Once all the required steps are performed for the initiator, the last thing to
do is run the group. A blocking call to the runGroup()method can be performed
which, once returned from, will guarantee the object has been setup and the
group created can be called, or a new Thread can be created on the object and
polled until the current status of the object is BonehRSAState.D_CALCULATED.
10.10 Creating the Group
During the protocol, a group initiator first announces a group of size k. Each
BonehObject which chooses to join sends a request to join the group. If ac-
cepted into the group, the initiator sends a response with an associated ID. If
rejected, the initiator sends an appropriate rejection response.
Once k is reached, the initiator sends out a memberlist mapping of {M2MI.Unihandle,ID}.
This sets up the polynomial values to be evaluated for each group member. It
should be noted here that the values of the ID do not matter except: no ID of
0 is ever assigned, the ID of 1 designates the initiator of the group, and no ID
values can be duplicated within the map.
The initiator, at this point, uses the methods as defined within the BonehRSA
interface to go through the different algorithm steps. For synchronization, a
mapping of {M2MI.Unihandle,BonehRSAState} is kept by the initiator and up-
dated by the group objects after each algorithm step is performed. The initiator
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continues once all the group objects report their updated status.
BonehRSA Initiator BonehRSA Group
announceGroup()
joinGroup()
assignMemberID()
distributeMemberList()
operationComplete()
chooseCandidates()
operationComplete()
shareCandidates()
operationComplete()
BonehRSA Member
shareCandidate()
...
Figure 11: Showing Initiator Relationship with Other Objects
Information regarding the newly created group can be accessed by any of the
objects within the group using any of the accessors such as getCount() for the
number of rounds that were required to create the group or getCalculatedN()
for the modulus N .
Sending a message once the group is created is accomplished by using the
sendMessage() method. This method accepts a BigInteger as the message
to be sent, so any type of padding or encoding has to be done before sending
anything to this method. Once all the pieces are received from each of the other
members, the original message is printed to the console.
11 Results
After implementing the aforementioned algorithm, a test was run for creating
50 different groups of size k = 3, k = 5, k = 10, and k = 20. Modulus lengths
25
of size 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096-bits were all created and tested.
11.1 Expected
Before any analysis can be done, an expected curve has to be created to be
a baseline for all the results. To do this, the probability of finding two prime
numbers must first be defined. This is accomplished by first understanding that
the number of prime numbers grows, as a generalization, at a rate of xln(x) . This
function is defined as pi(x). Since the project requires all primes to be Blum
integers, and assuming the distribution of prime numbers is equal between num-
bers that are 1 mod 4 and 3 mod 4, this leaves pi(x)2 prime numbers to choose
from.
In the project software implementation, given a length of N , the length of p
is chosen to be of size log2(N)2 − 3 and q is chosen to be of size log2(N)2 +3. More
explanation needed here.
Finding the probability of choosing a prime number is the ratio of prime
numbers to composite numbers. Moreover, because the experiments are run as
powers of 2, further reduction is possible.
P (x) =
pi(x)
2
x
4
P (x) =
2
ln(x)
P (2x) =
2
x · ln(2)
Next, an equality must be setup to find the average number of times that it
can be expected the round does not produce a set of two primes.
P (2log2(N)) = 1− 2
( log2(N)2 − 3) · ( log2(N)2 − 3)
P (2log2(N))x ≤ 0.50
x >
ln(0.50)
ln(P (2log2(N)))
Solving for x gives the expected results for each of the different sizes of N .
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11.2 Experimental
Once the expected numbers are calculated, test trials were run for group sizes
of 3, 5, 10 and 20 all with different modulus sizes of 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024,
2048 and 4096-bits.
Group Size (k)
3 5 10 20
lo
g 2
(N
)
64 147.74 111.64 128.08 173.58
128 544.44 533.04 532.40 623.36
256 1988.46 2155.46 1958.54 2200.10
512 8232.50 8265.52 7931.18 8211.50
1024 24080.70 21684.76 25097.68 23156.24
2048 57002.20 36138.90 41712.90 43813.92
4096 75041.76 64210.38 67786.30 58203.86
Table 9: Average Rounds To Create A k-sized RSA Group
It is seen that the expected line is slightly less than the experimental results.
This suggests that some valid composite numbers which are valid for RSA are
actually failing the probabilistic biprimality tests. Moreover, there is a curve
that occurs within the data for large numbers, deviating from the expected
values. If the total number of rounds are weighted by the number of successful
group creations as opposed to the total number of group creations, the deviation
is significantly less. This suggests that, for these larger numbers, the probability
of a false positive on the biprimality tests is relatively high.
This deviation can be remedied by weighting the average number of group
creations by the success rate of the group creation process.
The larger the N , the larger the deviation from the group simply due to the
low group creation success rate. For the case of log2(N) = 4096, the overall
success rate was on the order of 15%.
Average Rounds/Bit % Successful Normalized
lo
g 2
(N
)
64 140.26 2.1916 100.0 2.1916
128 558.31 4.3618 99.5 4.3837
256 2075.64 8.1080 97.5 8.3159
512 8160.18 15.9378 94.5 16.8654
1024 23504.85 22.9540 72.0 31.8805
2048 44666.98 21.8100 45.0 48.4333
4096 66079.96 16.1328 15.0 106.2105
Table 10: Total Statistics
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Figure 12: Average Number of Trails Total
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Figure 13: Average Number of Trails Successful
Though the group creation process may return a false positive, for very large
numbers, and the average number of rounds required to successfully create a
group may be significantly large, the histograms of all group creations (both
28
successful and unsuccessful) show that most groups are created well within the
expected average for the larger numbers. These histograms and cumulative per-
centages are shown in the Appendices.
The results show a linearly increasing average number of rounds required to
build groups with larger modulus numbers. This is on par with the exponential
increase of prime numbers to composite numbers ratio as defined by the prime
number function pi(x) and approximated by xln(x) .
Unfortunately, the results also show a large variance in the number of rounds
required to create a group of a specific size. In a mobile ad-hoc network, this is
simply unacceptable performance and cannot be considered feasible to perform
the operations as described in this paper. Fortunately, in networks where reli-
ability and network connectivity is relatively high, the setup time could almost
be considered insignificant versus the security gained through parties that only
have semi-trusting relationships.
Lastly, it can be seen in the calculation of e−1 mod φ(N) section of the algo-
rithm that the values of a and b, found through use of the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm, have the possibility of being very large numbers which cannot be
reduced due to the fact that φ(N) is unknown. This can cause for a very large
amount of computational overhead when decrypting any message sent though
the technique described. Considering that mobile ad-hoc networks are usually
of the embedded type of computer and extremely limited in the amount of com-
puting power at the disposal of the machine, performing this operation many
times is not very feasible.
12 Conclusion
Presented was a distributed public-key creation system for ad-hoc groups based
on a traditional RSA system. The system presented was able to create these
secure groups with a 1024-bit RSA modulus within an average of around 32689
rounds. Unfortunately, there is a very large variance and undetermined amount
of time, due to the independent choice of random variables for the candidacy of
p and q, associated with the algorithm which yields the algorithm impractical
for real world use in mobile ad-hoc networks due to the volatile nature of such
networks.
On the other hand, but the algorithm may show itself useful in other net-
works where the setup time for a 1024-bit of 2048-bit modulus is significantly
less than the overall lifetime of the network. In these cases, though the setup
time may be long, the generation of a secure group given a semi-trusting rela-
tionship with each of the players makes sense.
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In the end, the algorithm described proved useful when dealing with net-
works that have a high connection reliability and are non-volatile where the
computation and real time overhead required for creating the secure RSA group
is insignificant when compared to the amount of time the group will be estab-
lished. Moreover, the complexity and the number of rounds required for the
creation of the secure RSA group is not feasible for the current set of embed-
ded systems used in mobile ad-hoc networks today, but with an invention of a
hardware accelerated RSA engine to perform the large modular exponentiation
and improved battery life for longer radio communication, this solution can be
revisited as a way to create secure groups between semi-trusted parties in less
volatile mobile ad-hoc networks.
13 Future Work
Though the testing was successful in creating a secure RSA group using the
protocol as defined by Boneh, there are still some outstanding questions as well
as implementation details that were not within the scope of this project but still
are required to fully implement the secure RSA group.
First, a secure M2MI Unihandle implementation is required to provide ap-
propriate security during the protocol. Once implemented, adding the function-
ality to the current software functionality should be relatively trivial and should
not change any of the underlying architecture.
Second, the peculiar deviation in the average number of rounds required to
create a group is not understood. Since this deviation occurs at larger lengths
of N , it is definitely worth investigating to see if there is an upper bound to the
number of rounds required to find a valid modulus and a reason why, for these
larger numbers, the failure rate of the probabilistic biprimality tests fail.
Along the same line of thought, because the distribution of the number of
rounds required for group creation is an exponential, the significant majority
of groups are created significantly less than the maximum outliers. It is worth
investigating whether resetting the pseudo-random number generator after a
specified count may be worth while in achieving a secure group quicker without
having to fully create all groups.
Next, all objects are setup to run as quickly as possible without any user in-
teraction. All messages being passed back and forth are automatically assumed
correct and are never passed above the BonehObject object. This was done to
facilitate a very fast group setup time and avoid any and all user interaction.
Unfortunately, this is not desirable when deployed so a MessageSink will be
necessary to act as a control channel allowing a supervisory object to control
group creations, joining, message sending and message receiving.
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Moreover, there is no way to store the group configuration or private key
information to retrieve it later. Once any member of the group leaves, it is
assumed the group is disbanded and a new group must then be created.
Lastly, measures need to be taken to tolerate deviant members within the
group creation process. Boneh alluded to the fact that his method can be tol-
erant if certain measures are taken but might be susceptible in the trivial case.
31
14 References
1. Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., and Wigderson, A. 1988. Completeness the-
orems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation. Pro-
ceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
(Chicago, Ill., May 2-4). ACM, New York, pp. 1-10.
2. Benaloh (Cohen), J. 1987. Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares
of a secret secret. Advances in Cryptology - Crypto ’86. Lecure Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 263. Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 251-260.
3. Boneh, D., Franklin, M. 2001. Efficient generation of shared RSA keys.
Proceedings Crypto ’97. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1233.
Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 425-439.
4. Catalano D, Gennaro R, Halevi S. Computing Inverses over A Shared
Secret Modulus. Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807. Springer-Verlag, New York, pp.
190-206.
5. Malkin M, Wu T, Boneh D. Experimenting with shared generation of RSA
keys. Internet society’s symposium on network and distributed system
security (SNDSS), 1999; pp. 43-56.
6. Shamir, A. 1979. How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22, 11 (Nov.),
612-613.
32
Appendix A: GroupTest.java
import edu.rit.m2mi.M2MI ;
/**
* Test program that will run a number of times through the group creation
* process and print out an average of the number of rounds required
* to create the group.
*
* @author Brian Padalino
*/
public class GroupTest {
/**
* Perform the test for <i>n</i> iterations and return the average
* number of iterations for group creation.
*
* @param n The number of times to perform the test.
* @return The average number of rounds required to run the test.
*/
private static int performTest( int n, int k, int numbits ) {
int average = 0 ;
for( int i = 0 ; i < n ; i++ ) {
System.out.println( "Starting test #" + i ) ;
BonehObject[] objects = new BonehObject[k] ;
for( int j = 0 ; j < objects.length ; j++ ) {
objects[j] = new BonehObject( "" + j,
(long)((i+1)*(j+1)*n*k*numbits) ) ;
objects[j].setNumBits( numbits ) ;
}
objects[0].setGroupName( "Group" ) ;
objects[0].setNumberOfShares(k) ;
objects[0].runGroup() ;
System.out.println( " Count: " + objects[0].getCount()) ;
average += objects[0].getCount() ;
}
return average / n ;
}
/**
* Run the tests for 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits for a number of
* tests and print out the average.
*
* @param args Arguments that actually don’t do anything.
*/
public static void main( String args[] ) {
int average = 0 ;
M2MI.initialize() ;
for( int i = 64 ; i <= 4096 ; i=i*2 ) {
average = 0 ;
System.out.println( "Running tests for " + i + " bits") ;
average = performTest( 25, 5, i ) ;
System.out.println( "Average: " + average ) ;
}
}
}
Figure 14: GroupTest.java Testing Program
This program was used to generate the data used for the trial runs.
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Appendix B: log2(N) = 64 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 15: Histogram log2(N) = 64
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Figure 16: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 64
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Appendix C: log2(N) = 128 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 17: Histogram log2(N) = 128
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Figure 18: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 128
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Appendix D: log2(N) = 256 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 19: Histogram log2(N) = 256
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Figure 20: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 256
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Appendix E: log2(N) = 512 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 21: Histogram log2(N) = 512
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Figure 22: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 512
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Appendix F: log2(N) = 1024 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 23: Histogram log2(N) = 1024
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
56
44
.7
5
11
21
2.
5
16
78
0.
2
22
34
8
27
91
5.
8
33
48
3.
5
39
05
1.
2
44
61
9
50
18
6.
8
55
75
4.
5
61
32
2.
2
66
89
0
72
45
7.
8
78
02
5.
5
83
59
3.
2
89
16
1
94
72
8.
8
10
02
96
10
58
64
11
14
32
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Trials
Histogram of Trials
log2(N)=1024
Figure 24: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 1024
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Appendix G: log2(N) = 2048 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 25: Histogram log2(N) = 2048
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Figure 26: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 2048
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Appendix H: log2(N) = 4096 Trial Runs
Data taken using the GroupTest class as written in Appendix A.
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Figure 27: Histogram log2(N) = 4096
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Figure 28: Cumulative Percentage log2(N) = 4096
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